Doctrine, theory, philosophy, principles, belief, ideology, etc.—my extraction of anthropomorphics out of GA as a more total reading of the originary hypothesis has been aimed rejecting or, better, deferring all these guides to maintaining shared direction and resisting the distractions that interfere with sustained and mobile joint attention. All of these terms open spaces for disciplinary disputes and bureaucratic manipulation that can never be articulated in any way with the results of your practice—rather, attempts at such an articulation will always generate more indeterminate disputes and manipulation. You cannot have a doctrine, theory, philosophy, principles, belief or ideology that is not mortgaged to the metalanguage of literacy, those scene-fillers that make us forget that inscription generates scenes even while taking place on one. If we don’t have writing, and you report another’s speech, you say exactly what they said, and in the way that they said it, and therein lies an implicit commentary on what they have said, ultimately indicating some degree and conditions of reliability. When speech is reported in writing, the way they said it must be indicated in words—so and so claimed, stated, suggested, assumed, indicated, and so on, creating a rich metalanguage that fills in the scene that is now represented upon the scene of writing. And these verbs get nominalized and we find ourselves in a world of claims, statements, suggestions, assumptions, indications, and this is the world of, first of all, philosophical discourse and, then, all the human sciences that flow from it. In part, I can now add, because these terms are all essential to juridical scenes, where testimony is “assessed” and “relevance” is determined, and it might be more precise to say that the human sciences are philosophy applied to juridical scenes. All of this David Olson 101, as I laid it out in
The Transfer Idiom
The Transfer Idiom
The Transfer Idiom
Doctrine, theory, philosophy, principles, belief, ideology, etc.—my extraction of anthropomorphics out of GA as a more total reading of the originary hypothesis has been aimed rejecting or, better, deferring all these guides to maintaining shared direction and resisting the distractions that interfere with sustained and mobile joint attention. All of these terms open spaces for disciplinary disputes and bureaucratic manipulation that can never be articulated in any way with the results of your practice—rather, attempts at such an articulation will always generate more indeterminate disputes and manipulation. You cannot have a doctrine, theory, philosophy, principles, belief or ideology that is not mortgaged to the metalanguage of literacy, those scene-fillers that make us forget that inscription generates scenes even while taking place on one. If we don’t have writing, and you report another’s speech, you say exactly what they said, and in the way that they said it, and therein lies an implicit commentary on what they have said, ultimately indicating some degree and conditions of reliability. When speech is reported in writing, the way they said it must be indicated in words—so and so claimed, stated, suggested, assumed, indicated, and so on, creating a rich metalanguage that fills in the scene that is now represented upon the scene of writing. And these verbs get nominalized and we find ourselves in a world of claims, statements, suggestions, assumptions, indications, and this is the world of, first of all, philosophical discourse and, then, all the human sciences that flow from it. In part, I can now add, because these terms are all essential to juridical scenes, where testimony is “assessed” and “relevance” is determined, and it might be more precise to say that the human sciences are philosophy applied to juridical scenes. All of this David Olson 101, as I laid it out in