Paradoxes of Self-Referentiality as Algorithmic Practice
dennisbouvard.substack.com
In my essay on “GA as the One Big Discipline” in Anthropoetics and again in Anthropomorphics I proposed turning the metalanguage of a discipline upon that discipline as a way of intervening in the discipline: transforming disciplines into disciplinary spaces. So, for example, one might ask how a particular sociological inquiry helps maintain social cohesion in sociology, how an essay in psychology enacts certain forms of cognitive operation, what are the rituals holding an anthropology department or journal together, and so on (and even more so, in this very discussion we are having within sociology, psychology, anthropology, etc.). This approach has much more thoroughgoing implications which we can examine by taking into consideration that virtually all language in a literate civilization is disciplinary in the sense of being both historically and institutionally specific and authoritative while exempting itself from the discipline imposed on its subjects. If we start with the widest and wildest hypothesis, all the verbs, and the nominalizations formed from them, concerned with thought, speech, desire, ethics and morality, other than the Natural Linguistic Primes, are disciplinary. That’s the starting assumption, at any rate—we can remove terms that we deem pre-literate as it seems necessary.
Paradoxes of Self-Referentiality as Algorithmic Practice
Paradoxes of Self-Referentiality as…
Paradoxes of Self-Referentiality as Algorithmic Practice
In my essay on “GA as the One Big Discipline” in Anthropoetics and again in Anthropomorphics I proposed turning the metalanguage of a discipline upon that discipline as a way of intervening in the discipline: transforming disciplines into disciplinary spaces. So, for example, one might ask how a particular sociological inquiry helps maintain social cohesion in sociology, how an essay in psychology enacts certain forms of cognitive operation, what are the rituals holding an anthropology department or journal together, and so on (and even more so, in this very discussion we are having within sociology, psychology, anthropology, etc.). This approach has much more thoroughgoing implications which we can examine by taking into consideration that virtually all language in a literate civilization is disciplinary in the sense of being both historically and institutionally specific and authoritative while exempting itself from the discipline imposed on its subjects. If we start with the widest and wildest hypothesis, all the verbs, and the nominalizations formed from them, concerned with thought, speech, desire, ethics and morality, other than the Natural Linguistic Primes, are disciplinary. That’s the starting assumption, at any rate—we can remove terms that we deem pre-literate as it seems necessary.